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 Long Run Implications of WTO Accession 




In recent years, a standard approach to evaluating the welfare effects of trade agreements 
has been widely used. This approach begins by assessing the applied rate of protection in 
place before the agreement. It then examines the commitments made under the 
agreement—commitments such as tariff bindings made under WTO agreements, or 
commitments made under preferential arrangements. Where these commitments are 
below the initially applied rates—the most-favored-nation (MFN) tariffs in the case of 
WTO commitments, or the applied rates under regional arrangements—it is assumed the 
applied rates will be reduced to respect the commitments. After comparing the bound and 
applied tariffs at the finest possible level of product disaggregation, the tariffs are 
aggregated to the level needed for quantitative analysis. 
This approach seems a substantial improvement over the simpler approach widely 
used in earlier evaluations of trade reforms (see, for example, Brandão and Martin, 1993) 
and still used in studies such as Polaski (2006) where the stylized nature of the tariff 
reduction is captured in a measure such as a 36 percent cut in applied tariff rates. While 
policy agreements are sometimes described in simplified terms such as this, the devil is 
frequently in the details, and the impact on applied tariffs is likely to be quite different 
from the description when these details are taken into account (see Hathaway and Ingco, 
1995). Now that data on applied tariffs and bindings are available on an ad valorem basis 
for standardized commodities at the six-digit level of the Harmonized System, it can take 
into account a great deal of information that was ignored in earlier studies. This broad 
approach was used in (Anderson and Martin, 2006), and is now incorporated in the tariff 
analysis feature of software programs such as WITS (www.wits.worldbank.org).  
A key challenge for this type of analysis lies in the counterfactual. What would 
applied tariffs have been in the absence of the agreement? Here, there are two particularly 
interesting cases for analysis of agricultural trade reforms. The first is the short-run 
impact of the tariff reductions on variables such as agricultural output, trade levels and 
farm incomes. The second is the potential long term implications of these commitments.  The standard approach to specifying the counterfactual level of protection is 
appropriate for short-run analysis, although there is frequently some ambiguity. 
Ianchovichina and Martin (2004) for instance, assumed that most of the tariff reductions 
associated with China‘s accession to the WTO were actually undertaken before China 
joined the WTO, as China sought to establish her bona fides for the market-oriented 
WTO system. A similar ambiguity arises in analyses of the Doha negotiations with 
Europe‘s pre-announced liberalization of agricultural trade policies. Should such policies 
be treated as part of the counterfactual, even though they are not locked in through WTO 
commitments and hence are potentially reversible? 
For analyses of longer-run impacts, the specification of the counterfactual is even 
more challenging. We know that the appropriate counterfactual depends on secular 
changes in both the level of protection of the type analyzed by Anderson and Hayami 
(1986) and in the variability of that protection over time (Francois and Martin, 2004). It 
also depends on the important questions raised in recent research by Melitz (2003) and 
Kehoe and Ruhl (2003): to what extent would a more liberal regime result in growth of  
exports and imports at the extensive margin—that is through the emergence of new 
varieties and new products--as distinct from through increases in the quantities of goods 
initially traded? 
In the case of China‘s accession to the WTO, it is particularly important to 
recognize that, prior to accession to WTO, most of the important agricultural trade 
barriers in China were implemented through measures such as state trading, import and 
export quotas and licenses (Ianchovichina and Martin, 2004), rather than through trade 
taxes. Tariff rates for imports of many commodities were high, while the protection 
actually delivered appears to have been very low or negative for many of these 
commodities (see Huang, Rozelle, Martin and Liu 2007). Studies such as that by 
Schmidhuber (2001), which use initial applied tariff rates, tend to overstate the short-run 
impact of liberalization by overstating the amount of protection actually delivered to 
domestic producers. In this paper, we draw on new estimates of protection actually 
delivered to producers and consumers in 2004, as provided by Huang, Rozelle, Martin 
and Liu (2007).  In the long run, however, there is a risk that our standard approach to welfare 
evaluation may understate the benefits of reform. In the absence of commitments such as 
those China made under the WTO, it seems reasonable from the experience of other East 
Asian economies to assume that farm protection might have risen substantially for 
political-economy reasons. It also seems likely that this protection would have varied 
more from year to year, potentially increasing the cost of protection by a substantial 
margin (Francois and Martin, 2004). Further, the more liberal approach embodied under 
the WTO is likely to result in an expansion in the range of products traded. Our empirical 
focus in this paper is on the first of these weaknesses in the standard approach, although 
we address also the other two in a less formal manner.  
To do this, we take advantage of new assessments of levels and trends in 
agricultural protection in China and other East Asian economies emerging from a new 
World Bank project on global agricultural distortions (Anderson, 2009). The estimates 
for the higher-income East Asian countries update and expand on earlier estimates of 
agricultural protection in the region (Anderson and Hayami, 1986), and estimates for the 
other 80 countries included in the analysis allow us to put it in a broader context 
(Anderson and Valenzuela, 2008). New estimates for that project for China (Huang, 
Rozelle, Martin and Liu 2007) allow us to examine the stance of China‘s agricultural 
policies back to the early 1980s, when China‘s current generation of farmers first became 
thoroughly responsive to market prices.  
In this paper, we consider first the relationship between national agricultural trade 
policies and multilateral trade rules. Then, we consider the evolution of agricultural trade 
distortions in China during the reform era, and place this evolution in the context of the 
experience of other East Asian economies whose rapid economic growth first occurred 
when WTO rules on agricultural trade were weak or ineffective. With this as background, 
we examine what might be the driving forces behind these changes in protection. Then 
we consider the nature of the commitments on agricultural trade policies associated with 
China‘s accession to the WTO. Finally, re-examine empirically the long run impact of 
China‘s accession to the WTO, using the GTAP model of the global economy. In doing 
so, we consider the implications for China of alternative policy options for dealing with 
the very real problems of transition associated with China‘s rapid industrialization and the inevitable relative decline of agriculture that will continue to accompany its rapid 
economic growth.  
 
1.  Agricultural Trade Policy and the GATT  
 
The key principles of the multilateral trading system—nondiscrimination, transparency, 
the use of tariffs rather than nontariff measures for protection, and disciplines on the level 
of protection—are just as relevant to agriculture as to other merchandise trade. 
Unfortunately, however, these principles were severely compromised during the 
evolution of the multilateral trading system. For farm products nontariff barriers were 
allowed, tariffs were essentially unrestrained, and even export subsidies were permitted.  
A consequence of these developments was a progressive deterioration in 
international markets for agricultural products, a situation characterized by Johnson 
(1991) as one of ― Agriculture in Disarray‖. High and rising protection, and the use of 
domestic and export subsidies, reduced the trend level of international agricultural prices 
and increased their volatility (Tyers and Anderson, 1992). Much of the protection and 
market insulation provided by the major industrial countries was wasted—seeking merely 
to offset the adverse impacts of distortions in other markets on world prices. Further, the 
pattern of distortions was regressive from the point of view of global farm income 
distribution. Farmers in rich countries—and especially the larger farmers—were heavily 
protected while farmers in poor countries were taxed (Krueger, Schiff and Valdes, 1988). 
It was clear to any dispassionate observer that reform was needed in both rich and poor 
countries. Given the strong political-economy support for agricultural protection in the 
industrial countries, it seemed that the only feasible approach to reducing these barriers 
would be through international negotiations. A negotiated outcome provided at least the 
hope of finding a better alternative to continuation of the sporadic trade wars that had 
come to characterize agricultural trade in the absence of multilateral disciplines. 
This recognition contributed to the decision of GATT contracting parties to 
include agriculture in the Uruguay Round negotiations. Despite the well-known 
difficulties in reaching agreements for this sector, one was reached by 1994 (GATT 1994) that provided a framework for managing international trade in agriculture, 
including replacement of nontariff barriers by tariff measures and the introduction of 
disciplines on export subsidies and domestic support. While it had limited success in 
reducing protection from the levels that it had attained in richer countries (Hathaway and 
Ingco, 1996), it appears to have contributed to restraining the increases in protection in 
the industrial countries that had previously seemed to be inexorable (OECD 2006).  
Since the Uruguay Round, the procedures for accession to the multilateral trading 
system appear to have become considerably more rigorous for developing countries 
(Martin, 2007). This was particularly the case for China, whose accession to WTO was a 
major event both for China and for the WTO membership, and who undertook reforms 
that generated substantial benefits both for China and her major trading partners 
(Bhattasali, Li and Martin, 2004). Some have noted that these reforms involved major 
changes in agricultural tariffs, but this ignores the fact that most of the protection (and 
taxation) of China‘s agriculture prior to accession arose from non-tariff measures such as 
state trading. Detailed analysis by Huang and Rozelle (2004) takes this into account and 
shows that the reductions in applied protection to agriculture in China were much smaller 
than would be implied by the changes in tariffs required by accession. 
 
2.  The Evolution of China’s Agricultural Distortions  
 
While it is well known that trade and pricing policies in poor countries have tended to tax 
farmers in poor countries, the evidence on this issue has been much less clear cut for 
China than for other countries. Some studies examining this issue with price comparisons 
based on official exchange rates have tended to suggest that farmers in China were 
protected during the early reform years. However, during the socialist period, a key 
objective was to accelerate the rate of industrial development, and policy came to finance 
part of that through direct and indirect transfers from agriculture (Mao Zedong, cited in 
Lardy, 1983/p. 17).  
During the planning era, the prices of agricultural products also appear to have 
been depressed to allow food to be sold at low prices to urban consumers—a pattern consistent with that observed in other low income countries (Pinstrup-Andersen, 1988). 
Guo Shutian‘s estimates the ‗scissors difference‘—the extent to which the agricultural 
sector was taxed by the prices of agricultural goods being set below their market values 
and the prices of industrial goods being set above what would have been their free-market 
level. That policy involved total taxation of agriculture of an estimated 26 percent in 
1957 and 27 percent in 1978, primarily from direct taxation of the prices of agricultural 
goods (reported in Yao, 1994, p138). 
Once adjustments are made for the dual exchange rate regime that prevailed from 
the early 1980s until unification of the exchange rate in 1994, however, it is possible for a 
comparison of China‘ domestic prices with international prices to be used to make 
inferences about the implications of China‘s trade and pricing policies for agricultural 
incentives. Such comparisons are important because agricultural trade was managed 
using a wide range of nontransparent policies, including state trading, licensing and 
quotas as well as tariffs. During this period, the household responsibility system was in 
effect, so price incentives affected not only the real incomes of producers and consumers 
but also actual production decisions.  
Huang, Rozelle, Martin and Liu (2007) provide estimates of protection and 
taxation for 11 commodities: rice, wheat, maize, soybeans, cotton, pork, milk, poultry, 
fruit (using apples as a representative product), vegetables (using tomatoes as a 
representative product) and sugar (both sugarbeet and sugarcane) between 1981 and 2005. 
Over their study period, these commodities accounted for between 75 percent (in the late 
1980s) and 60 percent (during the early 2000s) of the total value of agricultural output in 
China. A summary of their key results is given in Table 1.  
A striking feature of Table 1 is the extent to which producers were directly taxed 
by agricultural and trade policies in the early reform era. This was particularly the case 
for staple foods such as rice and maize. Taxation of rice reduced returns to farmers by 
over 50 percent relative to world price levels. Cotton prices were also strongly depressed, 
partly because of a desire to have low cost inputs for the processing sector. Returns to 
other labor-intensive agricultural products such as vegetables and pork were also 
depressed, partly as a consequence of restrictions on exports. Returns to import-
competing agricultural products were much less seriously depressed, and some of these products, such as sugar and milk, had quite high levels of positive protection. For these 
products, the goal of self-sufficiency, or at least concerns about vulnerability if grain 
imports reached double-digit shares of consumption, appear to have resulted in much 
lower levels of taxation. Protection to agricultural exportables and to maize and cotton 
remained strongly negative in the late 1980s, while protection to imported commodities 
became slightly positive.  
In the first half of the 1990s, there were very important changes, including the 
abolition of the system of compulsory procurement of grains. The weighted average rate 
of taxation fell by half in this period, to just under 20 percent. However, key commodities 
such as rice, maize and cotton still had negative rates of assistance.  In the late 1990s, the 
taxation of rice diminished greatly, and taxation of a range of other exportable goods 
disappeared as export restrictions on these goods were removed.
1 Taxation of import-
oriented agriculture disappeared completely, to be replaced by significant agricultural 
protection. In part, this reflected the phase-out of the obligation for farmers to deliver a 
substantial amount of their output at below-market prices under the production quota 
system. Incentives for maize protection became positive in this period, with export 
subsidies applying in at least some years (Huang, Rozelle and Min, 2004). Between 2000 
and 2005, direct protection to agriculture became, on average, essentially zero, with 
protection to both importable and exportable goods reaching low levels.  
Annual movements in the protection rates applying to key commodities are given 
in Figure 1, taken from Huang, Rozelle, Martin and Liu (2007). The NRAf for rice in 
Panel A shows the extent of taxation to farm returns for rice. When the obligation to 
make quota deliveries at below-market prices applied, the depressed procurement prices 
accounted for a substantial amount of the reduction in farm returns. While these prices 
were to some degree decoupled from the marginal incentives to producers (Sicular, 1988), 
they were not fully decoupled in that they did influence the incentives for farm 
households to stay in agriculture.  
 The graphs in Figure 1 show the sharpness of the change in policies in the mid-
1990s, when the procurement system was abolished and prices were allowed to rise much 
                                                 
1 Prices for these goods still tended to be below world prices, but this was more a consequence of foreign 
barriers, than of barriers imposed by China, which were the focus of this study.  closer to world levels. While protection to rice was, on average, still negative, the rates of 
protection were very low. For wheat, market prices had always been above world prices, 
but farm prices were, until the abolition of the procurement system, below world prices. 
Following its abolition, protection rates at the farm level were, on average, slightly 
positive. For maize, protection rates at the farm level became positive after 1994, despite 
the fact that maize is generally an exportable. This was partly due to the presence of 
export subsidies on maize and on cotton, which were ruled out by China‘s WTO 
commitments.  
Another important influence on the incentive environment for China‘s agriculture 
is protection to the non-agricultural sector. Protection to non-agricultural sectors imposes 
an implicit tax on the agricultural sector by competing resources away from agriculture. 
Indeed Krueger, Schiff and Valdés (1988) found this indirect taxation of agriculture to be 
a greater burden on developing-country agriculture than direct taxation of the type 
observed above for rice in China. As part of the process of WTO accession, protection 
rates to both agriculture and manufacturing were reduced substantially, and these 
reductions were locked-in through tariff bindings. The relative rate of assistance (RRA) 
depicted in Figure 2 provides a simple summary measure combining the effects of direct 
and indirect incentives. From the Figure, it is clear that the combined effect of reductions 
in direct taxation and indirect taxation through protection to other sectors outweighed the 
effect of reductions in protection to protected agricultural sectors in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, and improved the overall incentives for agricultural production in China.  
The trends in China‘s agricultural protection have important implications for the 
estimating the impact of WTO accession. Even though formal tariff rates on many 
agricultural commodities were high, the rates of applied protection were generally low, as 
we have seen. Further, WTO commitments generally affected only imported commodities 
and those subject to prohibited export subsidies. 
 3.  China’s WTO Accession Commitments 
 
China‘s WTO accession commitments were extraordinarily comprehensive, covering 
tariffs, nontariff barriers, services trade reform and a wide range of regulatory aspects of 
trade, including introduction of an automatic right to trade in goods, as distinct from the 
positive-list approach that had previously prevailed. An important feature of the 
agreement was an emphasis on nondiscrimination and transparency. As noted by Kehoe 
and Ruhl (2003) and by Abbott (2007) the effect of such comprehensive reforms, which 
create many market opportunities, and create greater confidence in the stability of the 
trade regime, may well have impacts that go well beyond the effects of the changes in 
trade barriers. However, estimating the impact of these barriers provides a useful lower-
bound initial estimate.  
While China‘s trade regime for non-agricultural commodities included a plethora 
of nontariff measures, their protective impact appears to have been relatively small by the 
time of China‘s accession, at perhaps around 5 percent of the value of trade 
(Ianchovichina and Martin, 2004). Given the uncertainty about the distribution of this 
protection across commodities, we focus on the impacts of tariff protection in order to 
obtain a lower-bound estimate of the impact of accession. The estimates of tariff 
protection in 1995 used in this analysis are presented in Table 2.   
Examination of the estimates of weighted average protection rates for 1995, 2001 
and after accession presented in Table 2 suggests that substantial merchandise trade 
liberalization occurred in China over the period 1995–2001. Weighted average protection 
dropped substantially for wheat, beverages and tobacco, textiles, apparel, light 
manufactures, petrochemicals, metals, automobiles, and electronics. Analysis by Huang, 
Liu, Martin and Rozelle (2004) suggests that some agricultural commodities such as 
vegetables and fruits, livestock and meat, and rice faced negative protection prior to 
accession, generally as a result of restrictions on exports. Protection on these 
commodities rose (or negative protection fell) over the period 1995–2001. Accession did 
not lead to a significant fall in protection on most agricultural commodities after 2001. Indeed import protection remained unchanged for most commodities except oilseeds, 
sugar, and dairy products. 
Protection continued to fall for all other merchandise commodities, with 
especially big cuts for processed food, beverages and tobacco, automobiles, electronics, 
and other manufactures. A key element of China‘s accession agreement was the abolition 
of agricultural export subsidies. This required some significant changes. Huang, Rozelle, 
and Min (2004) estimate that there was a 32 percent export subsidy on feedgrains and a 
10 percent export subsidy on plant-based fibers (particularly cotton) in 2001.  
 
4.  China’s Agricultural Protection in International Context 
 
As we have seen, there have been substantial changes in China‘s agricultural distortions 
since the early 1980s, with most of these changes reducing the disprotection facing 
farmers. The changes have included reductions in taxation on exported products, 
reductions in protection to import-competing goods, and reductions in the taxation of 
farmers imposed through the procurement system. Much of the experience of China has 
been very specific to the national context of reform and appears very different from the 
evolution of policy in other East Asian countries. There are, for instance, major 
differences in the way that key policies have been used. The parallels between China‘s 
policies and those of neighboring economies seem limited on issues like the use and 
abolition of the commune system; the introduction of the household responsibility 
system; the use and abolition of procurement quotas; and the importance of state trading. 
Another major difference has been in policies to promote technical change and changes 
in the composition of exports, which have allowed China to maintain the growth of 
agricultural output and to avoid dramatic increases in the import volume of key products 
such as grains.  
Despite the differences between China‘s situation and that of her neighbors, there 
are also important similarities. As noted by Anderson and Hayami (1986) and  by Lindert 
(1991) the political-economy of trade policy tends to change in similar ways as countries 
develop. In countries as poor as China was in 1981, urban consumers care a great deal about the price of food and relatively well organized (Pinstrup-Andersen, 1988). Farmers 
by contrast, are numerous but poorly organized. They also tend to be subsistence-oriented, 
selling only a relatively small share of their output in the market. Agricultural products 
tend to be exports, and hence easily taxed through direct border taxes or, as in the case of 
China, through state trading enterprises. The result tends to be a policy of taxation of 
agriculture of the type evident in our earlier discussion of China. Historically, import 
substitution policies and exchange rate distortions have resulted in protection of the non-
agricultural sector, and hence additional, indirect taxation of agriculture.  
As economies develop and incomes grow, many of these elements change. Food 
becomes a smaller share of the expenditure of urban people. As countries become more 
urbanized, the urban community becomes more diverse in its interests and more difficult 
to organize. Farmers become more commercial in orientation, selling a larger share of 
their output in the market, which makes output prices more important to their real 
incomes. Further, they tend to use more purchased intermediates, which increases the 
leverage of an output price change on their net income. Finally, the share of the 
population engaged in farming tends to decline, making farmers easier to organize. 
Consistent with the theory of collection action (Olson, 1971), commodities where 
production is concentrated in particular regions or where processing networks lower the 
cost of communication and organization are more likely to receive high rates of 
protection.  
However, the relationship between incomes and agricultural protection rates is not 
automatic, and appears to vary somewhat by region. Figure 3 plots the level of 
agricultural protection against the log of the level of income for a wide range of countries. 
The tendency for protection rates to increase with rising incomes is strongest in East Asia, 
particularly Northeast Asia, perhaps partly because the sample contains countries which 
have achieved relatively high levels of income, and partly because these economies have 
relatively limited agricultural endowments and hence concerns about self-sufficiency in 
key food products. What is clear from Figure 3(b) is that, despite China‘s very different 
political history, its pattern of protection is consistent with that of the other North-East 
Asian economies, including – like the Republic of Korea and Taiwan (China) – a phase of negative protection and a rising trend.
2 While the evidence of this pattern in China is 
only available for 25 years, it is certainly suggestive of a potential common pattern.  
To the extent that there are common factors driving the evolution of agricultural 
protection in the four economies depicted in Figure 3(b), a key difference is the point at 
which WTO disciplines began to affect agricultural protection levels. In Japan, protection 
had grown seemingly without limit during its period of high growth, and only towards the 
end of the sample is there a suggestion of a slowdown in the rate of growth. In Korea, 
protection rates appear to have begun to plateau in the latter years, possibly under the 
influence of the relatively mild WTO disciplines to which Korea was subject as a 
member of the WTO. In China and Taiwan (China), the WTO disciplines negotiated at 
accession contributed—as discussed above and in Ianchovichina and Martin (2004)—to 
reducing protection to some degree. But more importantly in view of Figure 3, they have 
introduced disciplines on future increases in protection in China.   
 There do not appear to be any respectable efficiency arguments for such 
protection. One distributional argument is that agricultural protection increases in the 
early stages of development partly in response to an emerging gap between rural and 
urban incomes during the course of rural development (Hayami, 2007), but protection is 
inferior to many policy options that target directly such income differentials. Further, the 
observed pattern of protection has the undesirable feature of taxing farmers in poor 
countries, where their incomes are low relative to the rest of the economy, and 
subsidizing them in rich countries, where the income and wealth levels of farmers are 
frequently above national average levels (Gardner and Sumner, 2007). 
 
5.  Re-assessing the Longer Term Impact of WTO Accession 
 
In the light of Figure 3(b), the question arises as to how valuable WTO accession 
commitments are in limiting China‘s protection growth. When Japan joined the GATT in 
1955, and Korea in 1967, few commitments to limit agricultural protection were made by 
                                                 
2 Results in Anderson and Hayami (1986) point to a phase of negative protection in Japan at a much earlier 
stage. For a theoretical analysis as to why it should not be surprising for China‘s polity to follow this path, 
see Shea 2006). new members. Japan‘s and Korea‘s average nominal rates of agricultural protection at the 
time of joining have been estimated recently to be 17 percent and 8 percent, respectively, 
compared with more than 100 percent today (Hayami and Honma, 2007). China‘s 
average agricultural protection at the time it joined in late 2001 was even closer to zero 
(Figure 2). In assessing the impact of WTO accession on China‘s agriculture, to what 
extent should analysts take into account that binding its tariffs and subsidies at low levels 
potentially foregoes the losses that would have occurred had there been no such 
bindings? 
To obtain a better idea of the longer-run benefits of WTO accession, what is 
needed is to project the rates of protection that might have prevailed in the absence of 
WTO accession into the future (based on the estimates underlying Figure 3), and then to 
evaluate the effects of lowering this protection to actual post-WTO rates through that 
time period and discounting those increasing benefits back to the present.  
To make an initial assessment of the potential longer-term, advantages of China‘s 
WTO commitments, we begin by examining a scenario under which China‘s protection 
rates grow over the period to 2030 in a manner consistent with the international 
experience. Based on this evidence, we estimate a potential configuration of protection 
rates in the absence of the WTO agreement. These estimates are presented in Table 3. 
These estimates tend to be higher in products such as dairy products, where China does 
not have a comparative advantage, and where farmers are likely to become well 
organized. They are also quite high on products such as livestock products, in line with 
the experience of other North East Asian economies, even though China currently has a 
strong comparative advantage in the more labor-abundant agricultural commodities. 
To gain a rough idea of the implications of agricultural trade reform we 
considered two simple scenarios using the GTAP model of the global economy
3. In the 
first of these simulations, we examined the implications of China‘s reforms between 
1995—the start of the serious liberalization in preparation for WTO accession—and 2004, 
when trade policy for agriculture reached a much more liberal stance. From this point, we 
considered the impact of raising protection to the levels postulated in Table 3. This gives 
us two very crude estimates of the value of agricultural liberalization—one from an 
                                                 
3 We double the  Armington elasticities to capture the long run nature of changes in protection. historical benchmark dataset, and another from a counterfactual level of protection based 
on projected future trends in protection.  The results for economic welfare are presented 
in Table 4.  
From Table 4, it appears that the contribution of agricultural trade reform to the 
overall welfare gain between 1995 and 2004 was relatively small. Agricultural 
liberalization accounted for under 10 percent of the total gains from the entire package of 
reforms in agriculture and non-agricultural tariffs. This reflects, in part, the small share of 
trade in China‘s agriculture, and its relatively small share in output, if not in employment. 
When we consider the situation from the counterfactual identified in Table 3, the 
importance of agricultural trade reform increases very substantially. In this situation, 
close to 20 percent of the gains from trade reform come from reducing agricultural trade 
distortions.  
It is important to recall that the snapshot of protection in Table 3 would likely be 
part of a secular change in the pattern of protection. If the pattern observed in other 
countries were to be followed in China, then protection rates could go considerably 
higher than indicated in Table 3. In this case, the costs of protection are likely to rise even 
more rapidly, given that the cost of protection rises with the square of the rate of 
protection. As shown in Table 4, we project that the cost of protection to primary 
agriculture would increase by a factor of 3.5 with protection rising from its 1995-2004 
counterfactual to our projected rates for 2030, while the cost for processed agriculture 
would rise by a factor of one and a half.  
The true costs of protection to agricultural staples are larger than they appear 
because so much of it is provided in forms that create variations in protection over time. 
As shown by (Francois and Martin, 2007), changes in the square of the rate of protection, 
or in the intertemporal variance of protection, have equiproportionate impacts on the cost 
of protection. If we adjusted the cost of protection to primary agriculture for this factor as 




In this paper, we have focused on the importance of the counterfactual in 
assessing the importance of agricultural trade reform.  The conventional practice of 
choosing the initial tariff as the point of departure for assessing the consequences of an 
agreement appears to be a useful initial rule of thumb. However, there are important 
reasons to doubt its relevance in the case of China‘s agricultural commitments.  
The recent study by Huang, Rozelle, Martin and Liu (2007) provides information 
on the trends in protection in China‘s agriculture, highlighting the fact that most parts of 
the sector have traditionally been taxed, rather than supported by policy. Related work by 
Sandri (2007), drawing on the range of international experience in Anderson (2009), has 
examined some of the key trends in protection. Based on this, we create a projection of 
protection to agriculture in China in the absence of WTO commitments.  Given the 
relatively low rates of protection prevailing in 1995, we find that the welfare benefits of 
agricultural reform contributed a relatively small part of the overall welfare gain during 
this period.  If, protection to agriculture should in the absence of WTO commitments 
would have followed an upward path similar to that in neighboring countries, then the 
relative importance of agricultural trade reform would likely increase considerably. References 
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Exportables*  -51.3  -46.4  -21.0  -0.7  -0.2 
Rice  -54.2  -34.0  -30.4  -6.6  -7.2 
Fruits  -24.6  -9.4  -18.0  0.0  0.0 
Vegetables  -37.8  -57.5  -44.6  0.0  0.0 
Poultry  27.1  -27.1  -27.6  0.0  0.0 
Pork  -75.5  -48.8  -34.4  0.0  0.0 
           
Import-competing*  -22.0  12.1  -5.3  19.5  7.5 
Wheat  5.0  22.3  11.3  30.2  4.0 
Soybeans  2.8  1.3  4.7  29.5  16.3 
Sugar  43.7  44.7  11.7  26.6  29.4 
Milk  153.9  58.3  -4.3  18.3  24.8 
           
Mixed trade status*           
Maize  -32.8  -16.1  -25.1  5.3  12.6 
Cotton  -30.2  -34.6  -26.2  -3.6  0.7 
           
Weighted average  
of above products*  -47.4  -41.7  -19.9  -0.1  0.6 
Standard deviation
a  79.5  53.1  24.6  19.5  15.6 
           
Coverage as % of value 
of total agricultural 
production  
(at undistorted prices)  84.6  89.3  88.4  82.2  69.1 
 
* Nominal Rates of Assistance to farmers plus product-specific input subsidies weighted using the value of 
output at undistorted prices. Mixed trade status products included in exportable or import-competing 
groups depending upon their trade status in the particular year. 
a The standard deviation shown is the simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the 
weighted mean. Source (Huang, Rozelle, Martin and Liu 2007) Table 2 Estimates of tariff protection in China, 1995 and 2001 
(percent) 
Product  1995  2001  Post-accession
b 
Agriculture       
Rice  –5.0  –3.3  –3.3 
Wheat  25.0  12.0  12.0 
Feedgrains  20.0  32.0  32.0 
Vegetables and fruits  –10.0  –4.0  –4.0 
Oilseeds  30.0  20.0  3.0 
Sugar  44.0  40.0  20.0 
Plant-based fibers  20.0  17.0  20.0 
Livestock and meat  –20.0  –15.0  –15.0 
Dairy  30.0  30.0  11.0 
Processed food  20.1  26.2  9.9 
Beverages and tobacco  137.2  43.2  15.6 
  Total  4.8  7.6  3.6 
Manufacturing       
Extractive industries  3.4  1.0  0.6 
Textiles  56.0  21.6  8.9 
Apparel  76.1  23.7  14.9 
Light manufactures  32.3  12.3  8.4 
Petrochemicals  20.2  12.8  7.1 
Metals  17.4  8.9  5.7 
Automobiles  123.1  28.9  13.8 
Electronics  24.4  10.3  2.3 
Other manufactures  22.0  12.9  6.6 
  Total  25.3  13.5  6.9 
Total  merchandise 
trade
a 
24.3  13.3  6.8 
Services       
Trade and transport  1.9  1.9  0.9 
Construction  13.7  13.7  6.8 
Communications  9.2  9.2  4.6 
Commercial services  29.4  29.4  14.7 
Other services  24.5  24.5  12.7 
Total   10.3  10.3  5.2 
Source: Ianchovichina and Martin (2004) Table 3. Potential protection rate scenario in the absence of WTO commitments 
 
  CHINA 
NRAs  2030 
  % 
Paddy rice  100 
Processed rice  100 
Wheat  80 
Cereals  80 
Fruits & vegetables  50 
Oilseeds  10 
Oils & fats  10 
Sugar raw  150 
Sugar processed  150 
Plant-based fibers  40 
Crops nec  65 
Livestock  150 
Meat products  150 
Other animal products  20 
Other meat products  20 
Wool & silk-worm  40 
Milk raw  200 
Dairy  200 
 Table  4.  Estimated  impacts  of  reforms  from  different  levels  of  agricultural 
protection (welfare measure in 2004 US levels) 
  1995-2004  Counterfactual 
  $m  $m 
Primary Agriculture  385  1330 
Processed Agriculture  1589  2276 







 Figure 1. Nominal rates of assistance to rice, wheat and maize, China, 1981 to 2005 
(percent) 



































































Source: Huang, Rozelle, Martin and Liu (2007) Figure 2. Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural and non-agricultural tradables, 
and relative rate of assistance,
























a The relative rate of assistance is calculated as  RRA = 100[(100+NRAag)/(100+NRAnonag) - 1], 
where NRAag and NRAnonag are the nominal rates of assistance to agricultural and non-
agricultural tradables, respectively 
 
Source: Huang, Rozelle, Martin and Liu (2007) 
 Figure 3. Nominal rate of assistance to agriculture (NRA) and real GDP per capita 
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